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Abstract
For agents to act in collaboration they often require
an agreement that describes how they are to act to
which they are committed Typically agreements are
characterised as an explicit course of action or a goal to
be achieved In this paper it is argued such agreements
may over specify the interaction required To overcome
this problem a novel formalisation of agreements be
tween agents is presented that is based on rights as well
as actions to be performed Each agent that is involved
in an agreement is bound to uphold the rights of oth
ers and the implications of exercising rights and act
ing for others It is argued that this approach provides
agents with greater exibility in the agreements they
may reach while retaining the necessary group com
mitment
 Introduction
Agents are computational systems that inhabit and
interact with dynamic and not entirely predictable en
vironments They decide for themselves on the basis
of their individual beliefs goals etc how to respond
to the environment and other agents within it How
ever it is often the case that an agent is motivated to
achieve a goal that is only possible made easier or sat
ised more completely by gaining the collaboration of
others For example lifting a heavy table may not be
possible without help The process of gaining collabo
ration can take many forms For a task such as lifting
a table it may be sucient for one agent to simply ask
another for help However many tasks require more
 
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detailed communication to generate an explicit mutu
ally acceptable agreement through negotiation 	
 In
general the desired result of negotiation is an agree
ment to which each agent involved is committed that
describes how they are to act ie a state of group
social or joint commitment
There are a number of views on how states of joint
commitment between agents should be characterised
see Castelfranchi 
 Cohen et al 	
 and Jennings

 for examples A typical theory provides a charac
terisation of the state of group social or joint commit
ment and a description of the circumstances in which
it should be reviewed In short agents are specied
as being committed as a group to achieve some goal
or to execute some plan In many cases this is ade
quate but in others it falls short 
 Consider an
agent that wishes to query the members of a special
interest group SIG To do this it requires permission
from the representative of that group If the agent
queries the group without permission it may subse
quently be prevented from interacting with the SIG In
other words the agent is capable of querying the group
but if it does so without permission it may incur a
penalty or sanction such as having further messages
blocked Suppose that the agent gains the agreement
of the representative to enable it to query the group
but if it does it must provide a summary of the re
sults of that query back to the group In this case the
agent is permitted the right to query the group and
it commits to the group to provide a summary of the
results in return Here neither the agent that wishes
to query the members of the group nor the members
themselves are necessarily committed to any specic
course of action However if the agent does query the
group ie exercises its right then it is committed to
providing the group with a summary It may be pos
sible for this agreement to be described in terms of a
joint commitment to a plan of action However for the
goal to have satised the query to be achieved the ac
tion of the representative the members of the SIG and
the querying agent must be specied and scheduled in
advance Agents within the group that are capable of
satisfying the query must be identied their coopera
tion ensured and their future action within the joint
plan determined However between the generation of
such a plan and the completion of its execution the
world may change in such a way that replanning is
necessary For example a member of the SIG may be
come unavailable or the querying agent may discover
a more eective method of achieving its goal Fur
thermore without a notion of rights as distinct from
capabilities the agent intending to satisfy its goals by
querying the SIG must be considered incapable with
out permission
This paper addresses the question of how agree
ments between agents may be formulated so that the
exible interaction that is required may be specied
A novel formalisation of agreements between agents
based on rights as well as actions to be performed
is presented while the necessary commitment is cap
tured through the agents as a group being bound to
uphold the agreement The concept of a right and the
formation of agreements from rights are introduced in
section  Then a language for describing rights agree
ments and a notion of commitment to such agreements
is specied in section  In section 	 it is shown how
an agent theory may be developed using this language
which meets the desirable properties of such agree
ments identied in section  In section  related work
is reviewed and section  concludes and indicates di
rections for future work
 Rights and agreements
It is common for agents to be characterised in terms
of their capabilities ie the actions that they can per
form However although an agent is capable it may
not have the right to perform an action For exam
ple members of parliament may be capable of asking
questions of the government but do not have the right
to do so unless they are recognised by the speaker or
whomever has the power to permit such a right An
agents role in a multiagent system provides it with
a set of rights to perform actions Thus the actions
that an agent can use to achieve its goals without risk
ing penalties or sanctions imposed by other members
of the agent society are determined by those actions
that it is capable of performing and has the right to
perform If it is not possible for an agent to achieve
its goals within these restrictions it may need to gain
permission to perform an action that it does not nor
mally have the right to do or to gain the agreement of
another agent to act for it If an agent has the capabil
ity and the right to perform some action then it may
also have the power to perform that action for another
agent It may also be possible for an agent to have the
power to give another the right to perform some ac
tion For example the representative of a SIG is given
the power by that group to give other agents that are
not members of the group the right to communicate
with the groups members Without this permission a
message to the group from a nonmember agent may
incur sanctions on that nonmember
Agreements between agents can now be created
through the combination of rights and actions How
ever it is essential to ensure that the agents involved
in an agreement act in accordance with it  a notion
of commitment must be an integral part of any the
ory of multiagent agreements Thus an agent that
is bound to uphold ie committed to an agreement
should act in accordance with the agreement uphold
the rights of others and accept the consequences of ac
tions being performed and rights being exercised Fur
thermore to ensure the stability of group activity the
agents that are involved in an agreement must as a
group be bound to uphold the agreement  
 For
example if an agent is bound to uphold the right of
another to perform an action then it should not act to
prevent this right being exercised For these reasons in
the language for agreements presented in the following
section individual and group commitment ie Bound
and GBound section  constrain the behaviour of any
agent built using this specication
Given these intuitions about rights and commitment
in multiagent agreements what are the desirable prop
erties of an agent that operates in these terms Here
we consider the following example properties which
will be formalised in section 	
 Moral free will An agent is free to act for another
if it is capable of performing the action and has
the right to do so
Delegation Consider the following examples  An
elected member of a parliament has the right to
ask questions of members of the government on
behalf of an electorate However this does not
imply that the member has the power to give an
other the right to do so  In the futures market
a trader that has an option on or the right to buy
a certain quantity of a commodity has the power to
delegate this right to any other trader These are
two alternative views on the delegation of rights
that agent theories may model
Persistence Consider the following examples 
The right to buy a certain quantity of a commodity
may only be exercised once  The right to vote
may be exercised many times once it is permitted
until it is explicitly revoked Again there are two
alternatives oneshot and persistent rights
 A language for describing agreements
This section presents a formal characterisation of
the types of agreements that may hold between agents
and how these are composed from rights and actions
3.1. Syntax
Here we use three basic sets propositional vari
ables P  agents Agents and actions Actions to
construct the syntax of our language for agreements
L The symbols p and q are used to denote proposi
tional variables x y and z denote agents and a and
b denote individual actions We assume a STRIPS
like action model 
 where an action a  Actions
has a set of preconditions denoted by Prea and a
set of eects Ea Each of these are sets of atomic
propositions of our language L ie members of the set

 
 The performance of an action in a state where
the preconditions of that action are satised produces
the eects specied ie we assume that actions do
not fail Actions are either communicative or non
communicative Noncommunicative or physical ac
tions are viewed as primitive Communicative actions
consist of an illocutionary particle which is a mem
ber of the set I  fPermitCommit   g the sender and
recipient each of which are agents and the content
which is a member of the set of atomic propositions 
 
def  For example the action of x permitting y the
right to do a is expressed as Permitx yRighty x a
The language L is based on dynamic logic because
we want to be able to talk about agents performing
actions action sequences etc The members of the set
of atomic action expressions 
 
 associate agents with
actions where a
x
denotes the event of agent x doing
action a
Denition  Given a set of agents Agents and a set
of actions Actions we dene the set of atomic action
expressions or programs 
 
 fa
x
 x  Agents a 
Actionsg
Agents are characterised in terms of their capabili
ties and rights We denote that an agent x is capable
of performing an action a by Capablex a and C is
used to refer to the set of potential capabilities of agents
within the system As discussed in section  rights
characterise those actions that an agent can legally
perform Rightx y a is used to denote the right per
mitted by y of agent x to do a R is the set of po
tential rights A right may be an inherent property
of an agent possibly dened by the agents role in a
society or one permitted by some other agent In ad
dition to the capabilities and rights of agents we wish
to talk about actions actually having been performed
by agents Donex a is used to denote that agent x
has just performed action a and D is used to denote
the set of such formulae
Actions to be performed and rights that may be ex
ercised are combined to form agreements A is used to
refer to the set of agreements and ag with annotations
to denote members of this set The agents involved
in an agreement denoted by Agtsag if they are to
act in accordance with it must be committed in some
way to that agreement Therefore the notion of an
agent being bound to an agreement Boundx ag is
introduced Boundx ag is read
x is bound to uphold the agreement ag The for
mula Boundx ag captures xs commitment to act on
the agreement uphold the consequences of so acting
or not acting as the case may be and to uphold the
rights of others stated in that agreement B is used to
denote the set of such bindings
Now the set of atomic propositional variables 
 

of the language L is dened in terms of the set of propo
sitional variables P  atoms expressing that an action
has just been done by an agent D the set of capabili
ties C rights R agreements A and bindings B
Denition  Given a set of agents Agents a set of
actions Actions and a set of atomic programs 
 

the set of atomic propositions 
 
 of L is dened as
follows
 P is a set of propositional variables
 D  fDonex a  x  Agents a  Actionsg is
a set of atoms expressing that an action has just
been performed by an agent
 C  fCapablex a  x  Agents a  Actionsg is a
set of capabilities
	 R  fRightx y a  x y  Agents a  Actionsg
is a set of rights
 A is a set of agreements such that
a if   P D and   
 
 R
then Agree   A
b if ag ag
 
 A then ag ag
 
 A
 B  fBoundx ag  x  Agents ag  Ag is a set
of bindings of agents to agreements
 
 
 P D  C R A  B
We may now dene the set  of compound formulae
and the set  of compound programs of L
Denition  Given a set of atomic propositions 
 

and atomic programs 
 
 the set of compound formu
lae  and compound programs  of L is dened as
follows
 True False   
 
 
 if 

 

  then 

  and 

 

  
 if    and    then hi  
	 
 
 
 if     then      Meaning
do  followed by  do either  or  non deter
ministically and repeat  a nite but non deter
ministic number of times respectively
 if    then    Meaning proceed if  is
True else fail
The formula hi means that it is possible to execute 
reaching a situation in which  is true 
 is the usual
modal abbreviation for hi which means that ev
ery possible execution of  leads to a situation in which
 is true
This section has introduced the syntax of a lan
guage L for describing agreements between agents
that are based on rights as well as actions The seman
tics of capabilities rights agreements and our notion
of being bound to uphold an agreement either indi
vidually or as a group are presented in the following
section
3.2. Semantics
The semantics of the language of agreements L is
based on a possible worlds model 
 We rst dene
a class of models M
Denition  M  hW   i is a tuple associating
the possible multiagent world states W  a function
that assigns truth values to formulae   and an acces
sibility relation associated to programs 
 W W
x
 
W
x

   W
x
n
with x
i
 Agents is
the set of tuples representing the possible multi
agent worlds or states where each multiagent
state is a tuple of individual agent states W
x
i
is used to denote the set of possible worlds from
x
i
s perspective
   	 
W
is a function that assigns to formulae
the set of multiagent worlds in which they hold
 
x
 	 
W
x
W
x

is a function dened for each
agent such that for the atomic program a
y
 
 


x
a
y
 provides an accessibility relation over W
x
associated with the event of y doing a For in
stance if there is a state 	
x
 W
x
in which the
execution of action a by agent y produces a state
	
 
x
 W
x
 then 	
x
 	
 
x
  
x
a
y
 For compound
programs in  this accessibility relation is dened
as usual in the semantics of dynamic logic lan
guages !

From f
x
g
xAgents
 we dene   	 
WW
as
  fh	
x
 
 	
x

     	
x
n
i h	
 
x
 
 	
 
x

     	
 
x
n
i 
	
x
i
 	
 
x
i
  
x
i
g
Now focusing on the actions performed by agents
within a multiagent system we dene the set of paths
along which the state of the multiagent system may
pass This set of paths is used to dene our notion
of commitment ie what it means for an agent to be
bound to uphold an agreement see constraints " in
table 
Denition  The set of possible paths starting at
state 	 along which the multiagent system may pass
Paths

 is dened as
Paths

 fh	     	
i
 	
i
   i  	
i
 	
i
 W 
and 
  
 
s	t	 	
i
 	
i
  g
The precedence relation 
p
is dened for multi
agent states along a path p as 	
i

p
	
j
i
 i 
 j 
p
is
similarly dened We say that 	  	
 
i
 
p  Paths

such that 	 
p
	
 

For our purposes the class of models of L that we are
interested in are those that satisfy constraints " see
table  To determine whether some action or action
sequence has actually been performed the history of
what actions have been performed and by what agents
must be recorded in each state 
 Therefore as each
state has a unique history state transitions must be
strictly diverging C so we have a branching struc
ture of states For our purposes we require that the
action that has just been done is recorded within each
state C and that actions never fail ie the eects
of an action hold whenever it has just been done C
C	 means that agreements involving an action that
must be done may be true only in those states from
which there is at least one course of action leading to
the performance of that action In other words agents
cannot agree on the performance of impossible actions
C is the obvious constraint for conjuncts of such agree
ments Note that we do not restrict agreements con
cerning rights in this way The reason for this is that
it is not necessary for rights to be exercised This may
C if  

  	  a	 and  

  	  b	 then  

  

and a  b
C    Donex a		 i  

 W   

  and  

  	  a
x
	
C if    Donex a		 then    Ea		
C    Agree a
x
		 i  

  

 W    

 

and  

 	 and  

 Donex a		
C    Agree a
x
	Agree

 a
y
		 i    Agree a
x
		  Agree

 a
y
		
C    BoundxAgree a
x
			 i p  Paths

 

 p   
p
 

and  

 Donex a		
C	    BoundxAgree a
y
			 i  

 W    

and  

 Doney a		 and 	 

  

 W    

 

 

and
 

  

	  a
x
	 and   Prea	   

 	  

 	
C
 if    BoundxAgreeRightx y a				 then    Rightx y a		
C if    BoundxAgreeRighty z a				 then    BoundxAgree a
y
			
C    BoundxAgree 			 i  

 W if   

and  

 	 then  

 BoundxAgree 			
C    Boundx agag

		 i    Boundx ag		  Boundx ag

		
Table 1. Constraints on the class of models of L.
be useful if rights can be delegated see section 	 an
agent that cannot exercise a right may delegate that
right to another that can
C to C further constrain the set of models of L
that we permit by characterising the state of an agent
being bound to uphold an agreement First consider
an agent that is bound to uphold an agreement that
is conditional on  where   P  D see def 
Once these conditions hold then the agent becomes
unconditionally bound to that agreement C! For
example if agents x and y are bound to uphold an
agreement in which x has the right to demand payment
for doing b that is conditional on it having done b then
once Donex b is true both agents are unconditionally
bound to an agreement in which x has that right
Consider an agreement that is unconditional and
which states that agent x must perform action a From
xs perspective this means that its possible future
paths are constrained to those in which it does a C
From the perspective of some other agent bound to up
hold this agreement it will not act to prevent x fulll
ing its commitment Constraint  states that an agent
y where it is assumed that x  y will not perform
some action that deletes a precondition of the action
a that must be done by x this is often referred to as a
clobbering action in the planning literature Now sup
pose that the agreement is unconditional and provides
agent x with the right to do a From the perspective of
some other agent y it is similarly constrained not to
perform a clobbering action C# From the perspec
tive of the agent that is permitted the right to do some
action under an agreement the agent x has the right
to do the action a C$ For example an agent that
is unconditionally bound to an agreement in which it
has the right to demand payment for doing b will have
that right Finally an agent that is bound to uphold
a conjunction of agreements is bound to uphold each
conjunct C
A a
x
Donex a	
A a
x
	Doney b	 if b 
 a or b  a and x 
 y	
A Donex a	 Ea	
A 	Donex a	 	Agree a
x
	 for all    and   P D
A BoundxAgreeRightx y a			  Rightx y a	
A BoundxAgreeRighty z a			 BoundxAgree a
y
		
A	 BoundxAgree 		  BoundxAgree 			
A
 Boundx ag ag

	 Boundx ag	  Boundx ag

	
Table 2. Some Axioms of L.
To ensure the stability of group activity the agents
that are involved in an agreement require some kind of
group commitment to act in accordance with the agree
ment Each agent that is involved in an agreement
should be committed to do its part and not to pre
vent others from so doing Thus we introduce the no
tion of a group of agents being bound to an agreement
The formula GBoundAgtsag ag denotes the state of
group commitment that will ensure that each agent in
volved in ag will be bound to uphold that agreement
Hence the state of the agents involved in an agreement
being bound as a group to uphold the agreement is a
distributed state in which each agent in the group is
bound to that agreement
Denition  A group of agents X  Agents being
GBound by an agreement ag is dened as the con
junction of the propositions Boundx ag for each x in
X 
GBoundX ag
def

 
xX
Boundx ag
3.3. Axiomatics
It remains now to provide an axiomatic system for L
The language is dened upon the sets of atomic formu
lae 
 
def  and atomic programs 
 
def  The
additional axioms of L each of which correspond to a
constraint on the class of models we are considering
are A"$ in table  In appendix A we show certain
formal properties of this language This completes the
introduction to the language L
 Meeting the requirements
The language L enables the specication of agents
that may generate commit to and once commit
ted act in accordance with agreements In this lan
guage the bindings between a set of agents Agtsag
and an agreement ag that is a formula of the form
GBoundAgtsag ag represents a form of social com
mitment between those agents Here we propose a
number of axioms that capture our intuitions concern
ing the relationship between capabilities and rights
morality and the delegation and persistence of rights
see section  Note that the constraints on models of
L C" are designed so that any agent that conforms
to this specication will act to uphold agreements once
bound to them
First we introduce the communicative action
Commit and indicate how agents can place conditions
on their commitments see Norman  Jennings 
 for
more detail on the notion of conditional commitment
in negotiation Suppose that a necessary eect of the
action Commitx y ag is to commit the speaker x to
the hearer y to uphold the agreement ag
A Commitx y ag
Boundx ag
Now we can express that an agent which is capable
of acting for another under some set of conditions 
is free to set extra conditions on such an agreement
remember that   
 
 R see def 
A Rightx yCommitx zAgree 	
Rightx yCommitx zAgree
 
  
 
 
4.1. Capabilities and Rights
The capabilities of agents written Capablex a
correspond to those actions that an agent is capable
of performing whenever the preconditions of the action
hold So we dene Capablex a  Prea 	 ha
x
iTrue
Note that capabilities are properties of an agent they
do not depend on the world state and hence ca
pabilities are dened as part of the theory of each
agent Then in the theory of some agent x ie T
x

it will be true that if the preconditions of an ac
tion hold and the agent is capable of doing the action
then the action may be executed by that agent ie
T
x
 PreaCapablex a	 ha
x
iTrue The theory T
x

will then contain the equivalence of this as an axiom
A Capablex a Prea	 ha
x
iTrue
The rights of agents are distinct from capabilities
in that they describe those actions that the agent can
legally perform Therefore a moral agent if it does
not have the right to perform some action will not do
so axiom 
A Rightx y a	 
Donex a   
It may be useful in a particular agent theory for the
rights of agents to be persistent ie once an agent re
ceives a right it keeps it forever This can be modelled
by axiom  Note that this is dierent from the per
sistence of rights expressed in axiom  section 		
A Rightx y a	 
Rightx y a for all   
4.2. ‘Moral’ free will
The property of moral free will described in section 
can be expressed by an axiom that states that if the
agent is capable of doing a and has the right to do so
then it has the right to commit to do a for some other
agent
A Capablex a  Rightx y a	
Rightx yCommitx zAgree a
x

4.3. Delegation
Suppose that a necessary eect of the communica
tive action Permitx yRighty x a is to give permis
sion to the hearer y the right to perform a Note that
in committing to an agreement an agent may implic
itly permit another the right to perform some action
Therefore to express the property of automatic dele
gation of rights axiom  may be added to the theory
If automatic delegation is to be prevented within the
theory the the negation of this axiom is added
A Rightx y a	
Rightx yPermitx zRightz x a
4.4. Persistence
We wish to allow theories in which the binding to up
hold rights is either oneshot ie may only be exercised
once or persistent for the duration of the commitment
ie may be exercised an unlimited number of times
while the agent is bound to uphold the agreement in
which it is permitted Axioms  and  respectively
express these two alternatives
A BoundxAgreeRighty z a	

Doney a	

BoundxAgreeRighty z a  
A BoundxAgreeRighty z a	

BoundxAgreeRighty z a  
 Related work
Castelfranchi 
 distinguishes between individual
and social commitment arguing that a social com
mitment is not an individual commitment shared by
many agents see also Bratman 
 Social commit
ment or SCOMM is dened as a relation between
three agents and an action SCOMM x y a z where
x is committed to y to do a and z is the agent before
whom x is committed The important relationship be
tween Castelfranchis notion of social commitment and
GBound def  is the idea that the agents involved are
bound to uphold certain rights of others For example
in the state SCOMM x y a z 
 x is committed to
uphold ys right to expect it to do a and to protest if
a is not done This notion of committing as a rights
producing act is related to our notion of an agent y
committing to an agreement in which it must uphold
the right of another x In the work presented here y
is constrained not to act against x exercising its right
see section  However we consider rights that are
expressed explicitly within an agreement Rights and
actions are combined to form complex agreements so
that the consequences of exercising a right may com
mit the agent to performing some other action or it
may permit another agent some other right Thus
not only may committing be a rightsproducing act
but exercising rights or acting within the context of an
agreement may also be a rightsproducing act because
the agent is bound to uphold that agreement Castel
franchi also discusses the act of giving permission as a
kind of passive help 
 Within the model presented
here an agent that is bound to uphold an agreement
in which another has the right to perform some action
is committed not to prevent this right from being ex
ercised Thus states of commitment and the act of
permitting are closely related
Deontic logic 
 is a branch of modal logic that is
concerned with reasoning about normative behaviour
using modalities such as prohibition permission and
obligation Hence this is related to the intuitions
about rights and commitments discussed here How
ever a number of problems have been identied in us
ing such a system for characterising the act of giving
permission 
 Permission is commonly dened as the
dual of obligation 
 ie an agent that is not obliged
not to do a is permitted to do a In contrast we as
sume that an agent has the rights to perform some
action only if its theory contains the appropriate for
mula Furthermore if an agent does not have the right
to do a it must gain the permission of an agent that
may permit it to do a An agent will not have the right
to do this action simply because it is not obliged not
to do it
It was mentioned in section  that theories of joint
commitment typically bind the agents involved to
achieving goals or executing actions in the pursuit of
a shared goal There is a great deal of research on the
recognition of states in which there is the potential for
cooperation eg Grosz  Kraus $
 Haddadi #
 and
Wooldridge  Jennings $
 on team formation eg
Cohen et al 	
 and Tambe 
 and on characteri
sation of states of joint commitment eg Cohen et al
	
 DuninK%eplicz  Verbrugge 
 and Jennings 

Our work does not attempt to provide another theory
of joint commitment but focuses on what agents are
committed to The work cited above shares the idea
that agents are committed either jointly socially or
as a group or collective depending on the terminology
used by various authors

to achieve a goal or to exe
cute a plan Here we suggest that the agreements to
which a group of agents are jointly committed may be
extended by introducing explicit rights within agree
ments This provides a greater degree of exibility in
agreements while retaining the necessary commitment
to group activity
 Conclusions and future work
This paper has introduced a novel formulation of
agreements between agents as combinations of rights
and actions to which the agents involved are bound
as a group A language for agreements L has been
presented in which agents are constrained to act to up
hold the rights of others and act in accordance with an
agreement to which it is bound A number of prop
erties morality delegation and persistence are dis
cussed and it is shown how these may be introduced as
axioms of a theory of agency It is argued that the intu
itions captured in this model provide a exible way of
describing agreements between agents while retaining
a notion of joint commitment which is widely recog
nised as necessary to ensure that agents act on their
agreements
There are a number of avenues for future develop
ment of this model We do not consider an agents
motivation for seeking collaboration the generation of
commitment or the monitoring and revision of such
commitments At present the specication does not
fully account for the loss of commitment 
 Reasons
for a loss of commitment may be that it is no longer
 
The dierent terms reect sometimes subtly	 dierent con
cepts

possible to perform an action or exercise a right that
the agents involved jointly agree to no longer be bound
by the agreement or that the agreement has expired
for some other reason eg a deadline For example
it is unreasonable to expect the right to cash a cheque
to be valid indenitely
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A Soundness
Theorem  Let M  hW   i belong to the class
C
L
of standard PDL models Then axioms $ are
sound
Proof
 Axiom  is valid in M i for all 	  W M w j
a
x

Donex a and this is so i for all 	
 
 W if
	 	
 
  a
x
 then 	
 
 Donex a This is
exactly C read from right to left Thus 	
 

Donex a and hence M w j a
x

Donex a
 Axiom  is valid in M i for all 	  W  M 	 j
a
x

Doney b if b  a or b  a and x 
y Let us assume the contrary ie M 	 j
a
x

Doney b and make an analysis by cases
a b  a With our assumption
M 	 j a
x

Doney b we have
M 	 j a
x

Doney b which is equivalent
to M 	 j ha
x
iDoney b which means that

	
 
 W such that 	 	
 
  a
x
 and
M 	
 
j Doney b but then we have by C
that 
	
  
 W such that 	
  
 	
 
  b
y

but by C we have that b  a obtaining a
contradiction
b b  a and x  y Similar to the previous
case
 The proof of axiom  is straight forward from con
straint 
	 Axiom 	 is valid in M i for all    and for all
	  W M 	 j 
Donex a 	 Agree a
x

and this is true i 
   such that if M 	 j
Agree a
x
 then M 	 j hiDonex a And
this is immediate from C	
 The proof of axioms    and $ are straight
forward from C$ C# C! and C respectively
 
